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Here we propose a general relativistic quantum framework for cryptography that exploits the 
fascinating connection of quantum non-locality and special theory of relativity with 
cryptography. The underlying principle of unconditional security is causality and two-fold 
quantum non-local correlations: first entanglement swapping and then teleportation over causally 
independent entangled systems. We show that the proposed framework has following remarkable 
and novel features in mistrustful cryptography: (i) It helps in defining a new notion of oblivious 
transfer where both the data transferred and the transfer position remains oblivious. (ii) The 
authenticity and integrity of the data transferred is guaranteed by the fundamental principles of 
quantum theory instead of computational complexity. (iii) It directly leads to unconditionally 
secure and deterministic two-sided two-party computation which is currently considered to be 
impossible. (iv) the proposed framework turns out to be asynchronous ideal coin tossing with 
zero bias which has not been achieved previously. (v) The same framework also implies 
unconditionally secure bit commitment. Finally, the combination of quantum non-locality and 
theory of relativity as discussed here can easily be generalized to multiparty setting that could be 
used to solve other mistrustful cryptographic tasks such as secret sharing and key agreement 
securely. 
 
n the last few years, researchers have shown great excitement in the area of relativistic 
quantum cryptography1-9,10-28 where causal structure of Minkowski space time or 
impossibility of superluminal signaling gives power to relativistic quantum cryptography in 
defining tasks that are not possible in non-relativistic setting, especially in mistrustful 
cryptography. These interesting developments give further hope for defining a more general 
framework in relativistic quantum theory that would be sufficient to solve all the cryptographic 
tasks securely. 
 Kilian showed that classical oblivious transfer29-32 (OT) is a basic building block for 
many mistrustful cryptographic protocols, for example, two-party secure computations33. 
However, since computationally hard classical protocols can be broken, various protocols for OT 
based on non-relativistic34 and relativistic quantum theory22 have also been proposed. In existing 
non-relativistic quantum OT protocols, only data remains oblivious while sender/receiver can be 
well aware of transfer position. On the other hand, in relativistic OT protocol22, the data can be 
completely determined by sender/receiver while they remain oblivious about the transfer 
position.   
Moreover, in all previously proposed OT protocols, receiver cannot be certain that the 
data he received has not been altered during the protocol. Hence, currently it is known that 1-out-
of-2 oblivious transfer and deterministic two-sided two-party secure computations (TPSC) are 
impossible in classical/non-relativistic quantum cryptography35,36. These impossibility results 
have also been extended to relativistic quantum cryptography37. However, relativistic quantum 
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cryptography gives hope for secure implementation of nondeterministic two-sided TPSC and 
hence variable-bias coin tossing38. Moreover, asynchronous ideal coin tossing is impossible in 
classical/non-relativistic quantum cryptography39 while only synchronous ideal coin tossing is 
possible if impossibility of superluminal signaling is considered40.  
Furthermore, bit commitment is another very important and basic cryptographic protocol 
that is impossible in classical/nor-relativistic quantum cryptography41-43 but has been proved to 
be possible in relativistic quantum theory10,24,26. These no-go theorems show the limitations of 
classical/non-relativistic quantum cryptography while possibility results show that relativity adds 
its weight, and hence gives more power, towards quantum cryptography to evade such no-go 
theorems.  
At this point, we would like to discuss an important quantum mechanical concept, non-
locality, which has an interesting connection with cryptography and cryptanalysis. Non-local 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type correlations44 solves the very basic ingredient of 
cryptography, QKD45, that gives unconditionally secure means for secret communications 
between distant parties. On the other hand, in mistrustful cryptography, a dishonest party can 
exploit the non-locality (EPR types quantum attacks) to cheat successfully35,41-43.  
In this work, we exploit the fascinating connections of quantum non-locality and 
relativity with cryptography and show that the combination of relativity with non-locality favors 
cryptography rather than cryptanalysis. We propose a general relativistic quantum framework for 
cryptography and show that the proposed framework proves to be a building block for many 
interesting mistrustful cryptographic protocols that are considered to be impossible. For example, 
it directly leads to (i) a new notion of OT where both the data transferred and the transfer 
position remain oblivious, (ii) deterministic two-sided TPSC, (iii) asynchronous ideal coin 
tossing with zero bias, and (iv) unconditionally secure bit commitment.  
In fact, the proposed framework could be used to solve other mistrustful cryptographic 
tasks with guarantee of authenticity and integrity of the data transferred along with unconditional 
security against Mayers and Lo-Chau (MLC) attacks35,39, 41-43 and quantum attacks based on non-
local instantaneous computations46. The proposed framework attains unconditional security 
through combination of causality and two-fold quantum non-local correlations: first 
entanglement swapping47 and then teleportation48 over causally independent entangled systems. 
  
Mistrustful Cryptography 
In a standard mistrustful cryptography, communicating parties do not trust each other and 
security is concerned against these parties only (internal eavesdropping); everything outside 
secure laboratories of the communicating parties is assumed to be insecure. This subject is very 
divers and has gained a lot of attention especially in quantum setup; however, we focus here only 
those cryptographic primitives which could be used as a building block for implementing many 
other protocols. For example, (i) OT and (hence) two-sided TPSC and ideal coin tossing and (ii) 
unconditionally secure bit commitment.  
Oblivious transfer: OT was originally defined by Rabin where sender Alice sends a 1-bit 
message to the receiver Bob who can only receive the message with probability no more than 
half29.  The security of the protocol relies on the fact that Bob can find out whether or not he got 
the 1-bit message from Alice after the completion of protocol but Alice remains oblivious about 
it. In a related notion, 1-out-of-2 OT, Alice sends two 1-bit messages to Bob who can only 
receive one of them and remains ignorant about the other while Alice remains entirely oblivious 
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to which of the two messages Bob received30,31. It is shown later by Crépeau that both of these 
notions of OT are equivalent32. 
Two-sided two-party secure computation: Two-sided TPSC enables two distant parties Alice 
and Bob to compute a function f (a,b) where a and b are inputs from Alice and Bob respectively. 
The protocol is said to be secure if it fulfils following security requirements: (i) both Alice and 
Bob learn output of f (a,b) deterministically. (ii) Alice learns nothing about Bob’s input b and 
(iii) Bob learns nothing about Alice’s input a.  The no-go theorems for secure two-party 
computations are based on possibilities that one party, say Bob, can also compute f (a,b') where 
b' ∈{b1,b2,….}. That is, Bob can cheat by computing the value of the function f for all of his 
inputs b' and hence violate the security requirement of single input from each party. Lo35 has 
shown that Bob can do this by applying unitary transformations on his own quantum system HB. 
That is, the system HB kept by Bob must be an eigenstate of the measurement operator that he 
uses for computing f (a,b). Being an eigenstate, HB remains undisturbed by Bob’s measurement 
that makes computation of f (a,b') feasible. 
Ideal quantum coin tossing: Coin tossing49 is another fundamental primitive function in 
communication that allows distant mistrustful parties Alice and Bob to agree on a random data. 
Coin tossing is said to be ideal if it follows: (i). It results in three possible outcomes γ: γ+ = +, γ- 
= - or γ± = invalid. (ii). Outcome γ+ and γ- occurs with equal probability P+ = P- = 1/2 and both 
parties have equal cheating probabilities, γγγ PPP BA == , which means that the coin tossing is fair. 
(iii). If both parties are honest, the outcome γ± = invalid never occurs; P± = 0. (iv). If any one of 
the parties is dishonest, the outcome invalid occurs with probability P± = 1. 
Bit commitment: A bit commitment is also an important cryptographic scheme between two 
mistrustful parties, committer (Alice) and receiver (Bob), where Alice commits herself to a 
specific bit a in the commitment phase. In this phase or during the scheme, Bob should not be 
able to extract the bit value. In the revealing phase, however, it must be possible for Bob to know 
the genuine bit value a with absolute guarantee when Alice reveals the committed bit and Alice 
should not be able to change her mind about the value of the bit a.   
 
Proposed framework for relativistic quantum cryptography 
In a relativistic quantum cryptographic setup proposed by Adrian Kent, background space time is 
approximately Minkowski and communicating parties Alice and Bob are not the individuals but 
are agencies having distributed agents throughout the space time. The agencies are assumed to 
possess secure sites in a given inertial frame and can communicate with each other by sending 
quantum/classical signals at near light speed c=1. Moreover, the agencies have unlimited powers 
of information processing and efficient technology (quantum computers) and are restricted from 
cheating by principals of quantum theory only. Alice and Bob can communicate with their 
respective agents securely; however, all the quantum/classical channels between Alice and Bob 
are insecure. Both agencies have powers of instantaneous computation and time for information 
processing at their secure sites is assumed to be negligibly small. If one of the agencies sends a 
quantum/classical signal from point (x,0), then after some fixed time t > 0, the light-like 
separated agents from the sender in some given inertial frame can receive the signal on a special 
sphere of radius t and centered at x. 
In the proposed framework for relativistic quantum cryptography we assume that Alice 
has two agents A1 and A2 while Bob has three agents B', B1 and B2 respectively. Suppose Alice 
possesses secure site at ),( aa tx , space-like separated from Bob and his agent B' at positions 
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),( bb tx and ),( bb tx ′′
 
respectively such that tttt bba === ′  , bab xxx ′<<  and 2/)( bba xxx −= ′ . 
However, Bob’s agents B1 and B2 are at arbitrary positions ),( 11 bb tx  and ),( 22 bb tx  in the causal 
future of Alice respectively. Alice only knows the directions where B1 and B2 can receive the 
data but not their exact positions; they are light-like separated from Alice. Similarly, Alice’s 
agents A1 and A2 are light-like separated from Bob in his causal future at positions ),( 11 aa tx  and 
),(
22 aa
tx
 unknown to Bob.  
Alice, Bob and his agent B' share quantum system HS = H⊗HAB⊗HA'B' where H  =
 
ϕ
 
is 
kept by Bob while entangled systems HAB = HA⊗HB and HA'B' = HA'⊗HB' are shared with Alice 
by Bob and B' respectively. Alice and Bob give input data }11,10,01,00{∈′aauu  and 
}11,10,01,00{∈
′bbuu  to the shared quantum system HS by applying unitary transformations 
aa uu UU ′
 and bb uu UU ′  on HS respectively as follows: Alice applies transformations aa uu UU ′ on 
HA', performs Bell state measurement50 (BSM) on HA⊗HA', and publically announces her BSM 
result αα ′ . As a result, Bob and his agent B' get entangled; HBB' =HB⊗HB'. Simultaneously, Bob 
applies transformations bb uu UU ′ on H =
 
ϕ , teleports the quantum state ϕbb uu UU ′  to B' by 
applying local Bell operator bβ  on H⊗HB, and publically announces his BSM result ββ ′ . He 
also sends ϕbb uu UU ′  to either A1 or A2. Instantly B' (measures if required and) sends his system 
HB' = ϕbb uui UUU ′
 
to Alice where iU
 
is teleportation encoding. Alice applies further unitary 
transformations aa uu UU ′  and sends ϕbbaa uuiuu UUUUU ′′  to either B1 or B2.  
Alice and Bob validate the protocol if non-local quantum correlations between Alice’s 
transformation aa uu UU ′ , Bob’s transformation bb uu UU ′ , and teleportation encoding iU are 
consistent with BSM results ( αα ′ and ββ ′ ) of Alice and Bob on initially shared quantum system 
HS. This framework is secure in general and against Alice/Bob in particular through quantum 
non-local correlations and causal structure of Minkowski space time. 
Here H, HAB and HA'B' can be any higher dimensional quantum systems where Alice and 
Bob can execute any set of suitable unitary transformations aa uu UU ′  and bb
uu UU ′ respectively. 
However, to make the analysis simple, we assume in the rest of the discussion that H =
 
±=ϕ
 
where ( ) 2/10 ±=± while both HA⊗HB= (C2)⊗(C2) and  HA'⊗HB' = (C2)⊗ (C2) are 2-qubit 
maximally entangled systems with Bell basis 
                                                     
( )
2
1110 n
u
n
nm
uu
uu
m ⊕−+
=
                                            
(1) 
where um and un ∈{0,1} and ⊕  denotes addition with mod 2. The unitary transformations used 
by Alice and Bob will be aaaa ux
u
z
uu UU ′′ = σσ  and bbbb
u
x
u
z
uu UU ′′ = σσ  respectively where they agree 
on a code: if sender S (Alice/Bob) applies unitary transformation I, xσ , zσ , or xzσσ  on the 
quantum state ∈ϕ HS, he/she is actually giving input data 00, 01, 10 or 11 to the system HS 
respectively. Since ϕσσϕσσ ssss uxuzuxuz ′′ ⊕= 1
 
if ±=ϕ
 
, where we ignore the overall phase 
factor, we restate the code as follows: to send data }01,00{∈
′ssuu
 
or }11,10{∈
′ssuu , sender S 
(Alice/Bob) applies corresponding Pauli transformations },{ 1 ssss uxuzuxuzs ′′ ⊕∈ σσσσσ
 
on the 
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quantum state ∈ϕ HS. With two dimensional quantum registers, explicit procedure for our 
proposed framework is described below: 
(1). At t=0, Bob and his agent B' prepare EPR pairs ∈bauu HA⊗HB and ∈′′ ba uu HA'⊗HB' 
respectively and each sends first qubit to Alice.  
(2). At ba xxt −= , Alice applies Pauli transformation },{ 1 aaaa uxuzuxuza ′′ ⊕∈ σσσσσ
 
on au ′ , 
performs BSM on qubits au  and au ′ and publically announces her BSM result αα ′ . 
(3). At the same time ba xxt −= , Bob prepares a qubit ±=ϕ , applies Pauli transformation 
},{ 1 bbbb uxuzuxuzb ′′ ⊕∈ σσσσσ
 
and teleports the state ϕσb  to B' over EPR channel ∈′bbuu HB⊗HB' 
established between them due to BSM of Alice. As a result, HB' becomes one of the 
corresponding four possible states ϕσσψ bi= where teleportation encoding 
},,,{ xzzxi I σσσσσ ∈
 
is unknown to everyone. Simultaneously, Bob publically announces his 
BSM ββ ′ , sends ϕσb  to either A1 or A2 while B' measures and sends ψ  to Alice.  
(4). At )(2 ba xxt −= , Alice measures ψ , applies unitary transformations corresponding to her 
input data },{ 1 aaaa uxuzuxuza ′′ ⊕∈ σσσσσ
 
on ψ  and immediately sends the outcome of two-sided 
computation ϕσσσψσψ biaa ==′  to either B1 or B2.  
(5). Bi receives the state ψ ′  from Alice, measures in },{ −+ basis and gets joint measurement 
outcome ψ ′ .  
 
Figure 1: Relativistic quantum framework for cryptography in 1+1 Minkowski space time. 
Entangled systems HAB and HA'B' are represented by red particles while particle in green at Bob’s 
site represents H = ϕ . At time ba xxt −= , swapped entangled system HBB' is represented by blue 
color where dotted arrow shows teleportation from Bob to B'. For two-sided computations and 
bit commitment, Alice’s agents A and A' ensure that Bob and B' are at announced space-like 
separated positions bx  and bx ′  respectively.  
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For two-sided computations (TPSC & coin tossing) and bit commitment, the proposed 
framework strictly requires that Bob and his agent B' should have operated from their designated 
space-like separated positions ),( bb tx and ),( bb tx ′′ . Alice can insure this by assigning two more 
agents A and A' at disjoint sites nearby ),( bb tx and ),( bb tx ′′  respectively. Instead of sending HA 
and HA' directly to Alice, Bob and B' will share these quantum systems with A and A' 
respectively who then pass these systems to Alice securely.  
 
Applications of proposed relativistic framework in mistrustful cryptography  
In this section, we show that the proposed framework solves the problem of OT, deterministic 
two-sided TPSC, asynchronous ideal coin tossing with zero bias and unconditionally secure bit 
commitment.   
To implement OT, deterministic two-sided TPSC, and asynchronous ideal coin tossing 
with zero bias, let’s suppose shared quantum system HS is known to both Alice and Bob (priorly 
decided somewhere in causal past) and they use the code as follows: unitary transformation 
},{ xs I σσ ∈
 
correspond to classical 2-bit string }01,00{∈
′ssuu (or bit }1,0{∈⊕= ′ss uus ) while 
those of },{ xzzs σσσσ ∈ correspond to classical 2-bit string }11,10{∈′ssuu (or bit 
}0,1{∈⊕=
′ss uus ).  
The proposed relativistic quantum framework can also be used to implement 
unconditionally secure bit commitment as follows: the unitary transformation aσ  applied by 
Alice corresponds to her commitment aauu ′ . By applying },{ 1 aaaa uxuzuxuza ′′ ⊕∈ σσσσσ  on EPR pair
ba uu ′′ , Alice commits herself to the bit value 0=a  if 0=au  and 1=a  if 1=au . That is, if she 
wants to commit bit 0=a  , she applies },{ xa I σσ ∈  corresponding to }01,00{∈′aauu  and if she 
applies },{ xzza σσσσ ∈  corresponding to }11,10{∈′aauu , she is committed to bit 1=a . In the 
revealing phase, Alice sends ϕσσσψσψ biaa ==′  where her commitment is encoded in 
unitary transformation aσ .  
Oblivious Transfer: Our proposed framework helps in defining a new notion of OT where 
receiver R (Alice/Bob) remains oblivious about both the data transferred and the transfer 
position; he/she may know both the transferred messages ss uxuz ′σσ  or ss uxuz ′⊕1σσ but remains 
oblivious about the genuine one. On the other hand, the sender S (Alice/Bob) cannot learn the 
transfer position even after the protocol is completed. Moreover, R accepts the data sσ
 
only if he 
is certain that data has come from legitimate sender S, by measuring time lapse and testifying 
non-local quantum correlations established through local operations. Finally, in our secure OT 
protocol, S cannot change the data he/she started with otherwise R rejects the protocol – that is 
something not possible in all the previously proposed OT protocols.   
Two-sided two-party secure computation: Our proposed framework also results in secure and 
deterministic two-sided TPSC of function );,( ϕσσ baf
 
where aσ  and bσ  are unitary 
transformations on quantum system HS = H⊗HAB⊗HA'B' applied by Alice and Bob respectively. 
According the code, when Alice and Bob apply these transformations on ϕ , they actually 
provide input aaauu σ→′
 
and bbbuu σ→′
 
to the shared quantum system HS respectively. At the 
end of the computation, both parties know the same definite outcome  
                                                        
ϕσσσϕσσ biabaf =);,(
                                                 
 (2) 
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where teleportation encoding iσ  is non-locally correlated with local operations of Alice and Bob 
on the shared quantum system HS. Bob’s input bbuu ′
 
remains totally random to Alice while Bob 
also remains oblivious about Alice’s input aauu ′ . Finally both Alice and Bob get same unbiased 
outcome of function );,( ϕσσ baf
 
deterministically. As we show in security analysis, neither 
Alice nor Bob can cheat by altering their inputs to the shared quantum system HS  and (hence) 
cannot cheat to get outcome of function );,( ϕσσ baf  as they want. 
Ideal quantum coin tossing: Proposed framework is in fact an asynchronous ideal quantum 
coin tossing where both parties have equal resources and the protocol offers zero bias. That is, it 
fulfils all the security requirements of ideal coin tossing: P+ = P- = 1/2, zero cheating 
probabilities for Alice and Bob ( 0== BA PP γγ ), P± = 0 if both parties are honest and 1=±P if any 
one of the parties tries cheating. Although both parties give input simultaneously at time 
ba xxt −= , however, proposed framework is asynchronous in the sense that Bob and Alice 
reveal their inputs at different times; ba xxt −=  and )(2 ba xxt −=  respectively. 
Bit commitment: As for as bit commitment is concerned, Bob need not to send ϕσb  to Ai. We 
show in the security analysis that (i) Committer Alice cannot alter her commitment aσ  (or aauu ′
or a ) after announcement of her BSM result αα ′ . (ii) Receiver Bob remains unable to know 
Alice’s committed bit a  during the protocol. (iii) Framework allows Bob to know the definite 
Alice’s commitment },{ xa I σσ ∈  ( }01,00{∈′aauu  or 0=a ) or },{ xzza σσσσ ∈  ( }11,10{∈′aauu  or 
1=a ) at the end of protocol. (iv) Two-fold quantum non-local correlations guarantee Bob to 
reject the protocol if Alice tries to alter her commitment in the revealing phase.  
Proposed framework can be modified for computational basis with transformations 
},{ 1 ssss uxuzuxuzs ′′ ⊕∈ σσσσσ
 
on the state ϕ ; ϕσσϕσσ ssss uxuzuxuz ′′ ⊕= 1
 
if }1,0{∈ϕ . These 
operations by sender guarantee that receiver can get only either },{ zs I σσ ∈  or },{ xzxs σσσσ ∈  
but not the exact Pauli operator. That is, receiver can successfully guess either sender has sent 
data }10,00{∈
′ssuu  or }11,01{∈′ssuu  but not the definite 2-bit string ssuu ′ . 
 
Security analysis 
In this section, we show that the power of two-fold quantum non-local correlations and special 
theory of relativity bounds both parties to remain fair and act according to the agreed codes: use 
genuine transformations, priorly agreed basis, and respond within allocated times. The 
underlying principle of unconditional security in the proposed framework is causality and two-
fold quantum non-local correlations: first entanglement swapping and then teleportation over 
causally independent entangled systems. That is, for each aσ  and every value of Alice’s BSM 
result αα ′ , there will be unique swapped Bell state bbuu ′  and hence unique teleportation 
encoding
 
iσ  corresponding to BSM result of Bob ββ ′  as shown in table 1 & 2.  
From ϕσb , ϕσσψ bi= , and measuring time lapse, Alice can verify that whether 
Bob’s actions are consistent with his BSM result ββ ′and corresponding teleportation operator iσ
or not. On the other hand, if Alice’s input aσ  is consistent with Alice’s BSM result αα ′ , 
swapped entangled state bbuu ′  (hence corresponding teleportation operator iσ ) and Alice 
replied within allocated time, Bob verifies that Alice is fair otherwise aborts the protocol. 
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In our proposed framework, security against mistrustful Alice and Bob lies in following 
requirements: (i) Alice (Bob) should not be able to know the definite Bob’s input bσ  (Alice’s 
input aσ ) even at the end of protocol. (ii) Before or during the protocol, Alice (Bob) should not 
know the position Ai (Bi) where Bob (Alice) will send the data until her (his) agents receive the 
data. Similarly, Alice (Bob) should not know the position of Bi (Ai) even at the end of protocol.  
(iii) Proposed framework should not allow Alice (Bob) to alter her (his) input aσ  ( bσ
 
) from 
},{ xa I σσ ∈  to },{ xzza σσσσ ∈  (from },{ xb I σσ ∈  to },{ xzzb σσσσ ∈ ) during the protocol and 
hence should allow Alice (Bob) to get joint measurement outcome ϕσσσψ bia=′
 
of her (his) 
choice. (iv) Proposed framework should be resistant to Mayers and Lo-Chau attacks41-43 where 
Alice can delay her input and try to influence measurement outcome ϕσσσψ bia=′
 
by getting 
information about Bob’s input bσ . (v) Proposed framework should evade entanglement-based 
quantum attacks through non-local instantaneous computations. In other words, Alice responding 
from other than her announced position must be detected while Bob and B' must not be able to 
know Alice’s input aσ
 
during the protocol; before time )(2 ba xxt −=  where Alice reveals her 
oblivious input. 
(i) Data remains oblivious: As for as Bob’s data is concerned, Alice cannot find the exact value 
of bσ
 
deterministically during or after the protocol – by measuring ϕσb , Alice can find that 
either }01,00{∈′bbuu  or }11,10{∈′bbuu  corresponding to Bob’s operations },{ xb I σσ ∈  or 
},{ xzzb σσσσ ∈
 
but remains ignorant about the specific classical 2-bit string bbuu ′  (or bit
bb uub ′⊕= ) Bob has sent.  
Similarly, Bob cannot differentiate between Alice’s transformations aa uxuz ′σσ or 
aa u
x
u
z
′⊕1σσ on ψ  since ψσσψσσ aaaa uxuzuxuz ′′ ⊕= 1  where ±=ψ . That is, if Bob gets ψψ =′
 
then he will be sure that Alice has applied },{ xa I σσ ∈
 
on ψ
 
while },{ xzza σσσσ ∈
 
in case of 
ψψ ≠′ . As a result, Bob can find that either }01,00{∈′aauu  or }11,10{∈′aauu  corresponding to 
Alice’s operations },{ xa I σσ ∈
 
or },{ xzza σσσσ ∈
 
but remains ignorant about the specific 
classical 2-bit string aauu ′ (or bit aa uua ′⊕= ) Alice has sent. 
Since ψσσψσσ aaaa uxuzuxuz ′′ ⊕≠ 1
 
if }1,0{∈ψ
 
, can Bob find exact operation by Alice 
on ψ  by chossing different basis; computational one rather than agreed Hadamard basis? 
Interestingly, answer is NO. If B' deviates from agreed basis and sends }1,0{∈ψ
 
to Alice, 
Alice will measure in Hadamard basis and get either +=ψ or −=ψ with equal probablity 
unknown to Bob. As a result, Bob will not be able to know whether Alice has applied 
tansformations },{ xa I σσ ∈
 
or },{ xzza σσσσ ∈
 
on ψ . By doing this, Bob will not get any 
advantages but rather he will allow Alice to cheat; since he cannot conclude now whether Alice’s 
actions are consistant with non-local correlations or not. 
(ii) Transfer positions remain oblivious: Before or during the protocol, Alice (Bob) cannot 
predict the position where Bob (Alice) will send the data. The choice of transfer position is 
totally random and Alice (Bob) can only know the transfer position Ai (Bi) receives the data from 
Bob (Alice). Similarly, Alice (Bob) remains ignorant about transfer position Bi (Ai) even after 
the protocol is complete - Bi (Ai) do not communicate with Alice (Bob) during the protocol. 
Hence Alice (Bob) cannot compute time lapse or distance of the receiver Bi (Ai). 
9 
 
(iii) Zero biasness: As we have stated earlier, underlying principle for unconditional security is 
quantum non-locality and causality; actions of space-like separated agents are causally 
independent and hence they cannot simulate their actions at some fixed time. Inputs aσ  and bσ  
from Alice and Bob and their announced BSM results αα ′ and ββ ′ ,  result in unique swapped 
Bell state bbuu ′  and hence unique teleportation encoding iσ . At the end of protocol, both 
parties know quantum states ϕσb and ϕσσψ bi= . Hence both parties can validate or abort 
the protocol by looking whether the inputs aσ  and bσ  are consistent with non-local correlations 
among BSM results αα ′ and ββ ′  and corresponding teleportation operator iσ  or not.  
Let’s consider a simplest possible situation where 00=bauu , 00=′′ ba uu  , Ia =σ (
xa σσ = ), and Alice announces BSM result 00=′αα  then 00=′bbuu ( 01=′bbuu ). Now if BSM 
result of Bob is 11=′ββ  while teleporting ϕσb
 
to B', then xzi σσσ =  ( zi σσ = ). In the revealing 
phase, if Alice acts fairly and replies ϕσσψ biI= ( ϕσσσψ bix= ), Bob will verify that 
Alice’s input },{ xa I σσ ∈ is consistent with teleportation encoding xzi σσσ =  ( zi σσ = )
 
by 
comparing ϕσb
 
and ϕσσψ bi= . However, if Alice tries to cheat by using different values of 
za σσ =  ( xza σσσ = ) and sends ϕσσσψ biz= ( ϕσσσσψ bixz= ), Bob will extract 10=′bbuu
( 11=′bbuu ) and hence different teleportation encoding xi σσ =  ( Ii =σ ). As a result, Bob will 
abort the protocol by founding Alice’s input },{ xzza σσσσ ∈  inconsistent with the actual 
teleportation encoding xzi σσσ =  ( zi σσ = ). In conclusion Alice should not be able to change aσ  
from },{ xa I σσ ∈  to },{ xzza σσσσ ∈  or aauu ′ from }01,00{∈′aauu  to }11,10{∈′aauu  after 
performing BSM on HA⊗HA' and she cannot do this in our proposed procedure. 
Since HS is also known to Alice, she can find swapped entangled state bbuu ′  
corresponding to her input aσ
 
and BSM result αα ′ . Hence she can validate or abort Bob’s 
action by comparing ϕσb
 
(and ββ ′) and ϕσσψ bi= received from Bob and B' respectively. 
Hence proposed framework guarantees that neither Alice nor Bob can influence measurement 
outcome of joint computation by altering their inputs during the protocol.  
(iv) Secure against MLC attacks: Alice can choose Mayers and Lo-Chau attacks41-43 and try to 
cheat as follow: Suppose she do not apply BSM on HA⊗HA', receives teleported state 
ϕσσψ bi=
 
from Bob over EPR channel bauu  and teleports another arbitrary state ϕ′ to B' 
over EPR channel ba uu ′′  at )( ba xxt −= . She can know definite outcome of B' measurement
 
instantly but cannot find bσ
 
from ϕσσψ bi=
 
until she gets ββ ′  at )(2 ba xxt −= . Now in order 
to simulate her arbitrarily announced BSM result αα ′ at )( ba xxt −= with non-local correlations 
between ϕσb and ψ ′ , she has to apply specific aσ
 
on ψ  at )(2 ba xxt −= . Here Alice delayed 
input aσ
 
can be either },{ xa I σσ ∈  or },{ xzza σσσσ ∈  but she cannot give input of her choice at 
)(2 ba xxt −=  to get outcome she wants. In short, two-fold non-local quantum correlations and 
causality forces Alice to remain fair and perform agreed actions within time. 
Similarly, Bob and B' cannot cheat through MLC attacks. Instead of sending a single 
qubit in the state ±=ψ  at time )( ba xxt −= , suppose B' prepares an entangled quantum 
system ψ
 
where 
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∑=
i
iii βαλψ                                                           (3) 
and sends system iα to Alice. Since he is causally disconnected from Bob, he cannot cheat by 
enfocing Alice to get valid non-local correlations by applying unitary transformations on iβ .  
(v) Secure against attacks based on non-local computations: Alice’s input aσ  can only be 
found before she reveals if someone has, Alice’s BSM result αα ′ , Bob’s BSM result ββ ′  and 
both quantum states ϕσb
 
and ϕσσψ bi= . Let’s consider an example where 00=bauu , 
00=
′′ ba uu  and Bob and B' agree upon input bσ
 
somewhere in causal past. Instantly at time 
)( ba xxt −=  when Bob teleports, eave (say B') can found iσ  from ϕσb
 
and ϕσσψ bi= . 
Suppose eave founds },{ xzzi σσσσ =  then he can extract, from table 2, that swapped entangled 
state would be }01,00{=′bbuu  ( }11,10{=′bbuu ) only if he knows that BSM result of Bob is 
}11,10{=′ββ
 ( }01,00{=′ββ ). Now if eave extracts }01,00{=′bbuu  say, table 1 shows that he can 
find Alice’s input },{ xa I σσ = ( },{ xzza σσσσ = ) only if he knows her BSM result }01,00{=′αα  (
}11,10{=′αα ). Hence, if any piece of information from eave’s set },,,{ ββααϕσσϕσ ′′= bibE  is 
missing, Alice’s input aσ  cannot be extracted.  
 Suppose Bob and his agent B' have an arbitrary amount of pre-shared entanglement and 
have unlimited power of non-local instantaneous computations46. Even then they cannot find the 
complete set E  before time )(3 ba xxt −= . That is, they can only exchange classical information 
required to get outcome of non-local computations (Pauli encoding from ϕσb
 
and 
ϕσσψ bi=
 
here) at time )(3 ba xxt −= . Hence maximum commitment time is )(2 ba xx −  where 
Alice commits at )( ba xxt −= , reveals at )(2 ba xxt −= , and Bob finds Alice’s commitment at 
)(3 ba xxt −= either fairly from ϕσσψ bi=
 
and ϕσσσψ bia=′
 
or trying to extract from 
eave’s set E . However, minimum commitment time would be )( ba xx −  if Bob assigns another 
agent at disjoint site nearby ),( aa tx  who can receive complete set E  at time )(2 ba xxt −= . 
 Similarly, Alice cannot cheat successfully by allowing her agents to perform non-local 
instantaneous computations (entanglement-based attacks) on her behalf. Suppose Alice assigns 
two more agents at ab xxx <<  and ba xxx ′<′<  respectively. Since Bob teleports ϕσb
 
only at 
)( ba xxt −= , Alice’s agents cannot get information about Bob’s input bσ
 
before Alice. 
baba uuuu ′′  bbuu ′′)( αα  
00 00  
00 01  
00 10  
00 11  
01 01  
01 00  
01 11  
01 10  
10 10  
10 11  
10 00  
10 01  
11 11  
11 10  
11 01  
11 00  
)00( 00  
)00( 01  
)00( 10  
)00( 11  
)01( 01  
)01( 00  
)01( 11  
)01( 10  
)10( 10  
)10( 11  
)10( 00  
)10( 01  
)11( 11  
)11( 10  
)11( 01  
)11( 00  
Table 1: Entanglement swapping: This table shows all possible initial states of entangled 
particles baba uuuu ′′ and corresponding outcomes of Alice’s BSM bbuu ′′)( αα . For example, if 
1100=
′′ baba uuuu  
, then swapped entangled pair 
 bbuu ′  between Bob and B' will be in one 
of the four possible Bell sates: 11 , 10 , 01  and 00  corresponding to BSM result of Alice 
αα ′ as 00, 01, 10, and 11 respectively.  
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bbuu ′  
Bob’s BSM 
ββ ′  
B' 
ϕσσψ bi=  
00  00 01 10 11 ϕσb  ϕσσ bx  ϕσσ bz  ϕσσσ bxz  
01  00 01 10 11 ϕσσ bx  ϕσb  ϕσσσ bxz  ϕσσ bz  
10  00 01 10 11 ϕσσ bz  ϕσσσ bxz  ϕσb  ϕσσ bx  
11  00 01 10 11 ϕσσσ bxz  ϕσσ bz  ϕσσ bx  ϕσb  
Table 2: Teleportation: This table shows all possible Bell states bbuu ′  swapped between Bob 
and B' due to BSM of Alice, Bob’s BSM results ββ ′
 
on his part of the entangled pair and state 
ϕσb
 
and corresponding possibilities of state ψ
 
on the B' side. For example, if Bob and B' 
have share entangled state as 01  and BSM result of Bob is 10=′ββ  then B' will have state 
ϕσσσψ bxz=
 
on his side.   
In conclusion, the proposed framework is secure for the purpose of OT, two-sided TPSC 
and unbiased ideal coin tossing since Alice/Bob cannot influence the final outcome 
ϕσσσϕσσ biabaf =);,(
 
of her/his choice. Similarly, it fulfills the security requirements for bit 
commitment where committer Alice is not allowed to change her commitment while receiver 
Bob remains unable to know the commitment before it is revealed by Alice. 
 
Discussion 
We proposed a general relativistic quantum framework for cryptography based on non-local 
quantum correlations and theory of relativity. The framework determines the actions of both 
parties through causality and quantum non-locality. Quantum non-local correlations assure that 
communicating parties act fairly while impossibility of superluminal signaling is used for 
insuring timely responses. 
The framework is based on interesting combination of non-locality and theory of special 
relativity that gives new notion of OT; the receiver can only get specific information about the 
data but not its exact identity. That is, receiver may know both the transferred messages but 
remains oblivious about the genuine one. Moreover, the transfer position remains oblivious to 
the sender throughout the protocol while receiver can find the exact position only when he/she 
receives the data. The sender is guaranteed that the receiver can gain specific information about 
the data that logically follows from the protocol and know the transfer position only if the 
protocol is completed and the receiver acts fairly. Moreover, if the receiver completes the 
protocol successfully, he will be certain that the transferred data has come from the legitimate 
sender. The authenticity and integrity of the data transferred is guaranteed, the receiver rejects 
the data if the sender tries to modify it after the protocol has been started.  
This fascinating combination of EPR type quantum correlations with causal structure of 
Minkowski space time shows the power of relativistic quantum cryptography in defining tasks 
that are considered to be impossible in non-relativistic cryptography. For example, 
unconditionally secure and deterministic two-sided TPSC, asynchronous ideal coin tossing with 
zero bias and unconditionally secure bit commitment. 
Although it is standard in mistrustful quantum cryptography that both parties have 
efficient quantum technologies (quantum computer), the proposed relativistic quantum 
framework can be reliably implemented without requiring quantum computer. Both parties can 
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calculate );,( ϕσσ baf  securely with existing quantum technologies; photo detectors without 
needing long term quantum memory. However, even having quantum computers, neither party 
can cheat successfully.  
The proposed framework can easily be generalized for other multiparty mistrustful 
cryptographic tasks securely. For example, if B' is considered to be a third party instead of Bob’s 
agent then our proposed framework could be used to implement secure quantum secret sharing 
between sender Bob and receivers Alice and B'. The secret bσ
 
can be divided among Alice and 
B' in terms of classical BSM result αα ′ and quantum state ϕσσσψ bia=
 
respectively. 
We hope this work would open new directions in quantum information, quantum 
computation, quantum cryptography and their connections with special theory of relativity. On 
the other hand, proposed framework is purely relativistic quantum mechanical where both input 
and output data is associated with unitary transformations applied on quantum systems and it 
does not require any secure classical channels; classical information can be publically 
announced. Hence, it would in return prove to be helpful in developing our understanding about 
the true description of the world, the quantum theory.  
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